The recently concluded G7 meet in Germany and the virtually held 14th BRICS summit evince why the West may be adapting to accommodate the global South, particularly India, at a time when the chinks in the armour of both BRICS and the G7 are glaring.
While the BRICS faces an elusive unified position on issues with both subtle and stark differences between member countries on various issues including counterterrorism, the G7 has diminishing influence in the global south. These trends have intensified in the face of lingering pandemic-induced disruptions and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Straddling both major multilateral organisations places India stands at a unique vantage point, bridging the necessities of the global South with the compulsions of the global north.
The recently concluded G7 meet in Germany and the virtually held 14th BRICS summit evince why the West may be adapting to accommodate the global South, particularly India, at a time when the chinks in the armour of both BRICS and the G7 are glaring. While the BRICS faces an elusive unified position on issues with both subtle and stark differences between member countries on various issues including counterterrorism, the G7 has diminishing influence in the global south. These trends have intensified in the face of lingering pandemic-induced disruptions and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
Straddling both major multilateral organisations places India stands at a unique vantage point, bridging the necessities of the global South with the compulsions of the global north.
The supply of energy and trade connectivity with Asia have gained further salience for the West in the light of the disruptive constraints imposed by an active conflict in Europe. This realisation is undergirded by the post-pandemic realisation that concentration of supply chains in any one country or region may lead to long lasting disruptions for the rest of the world. As a result we have seen a host of economic-strategic initiatives by the West, particularly led by the US, aiming to not just establish predictable supply chains but a regional collective seeking to maintain a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. The reference point, of course, is China which is speeding ahead in this region in terms of building naval power and driving economic stakes.
At the strategic level, the US decision to launch the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) at this year’s G7 summit is in the same direction. Building further on the launch of the IPEF, the PGII has sought to “deliver game-changing projects to close the infrastructure gap in developing countries, strengthen the global economy and supply chains, and advance US national security.”
India’s participation in both the major global events showcased opportunities and challenges ahead. While the BRICS summit showed that differences persist between group members on issues of counterterrorism and global governance, the G7 provided a credible platform to realign some priorities for India in the light of strategic compulsions and changing priorities as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war.
India’s rising economic profile and a resilient economy have ensured that it is now a regular invitee to the G7 summits.
However, India should avoid the ‘G8 trap’ for now, even if a formal invitation to join the G7 may become a reality in the near future. Since 2014, when Russia was evicted from the grouping, the G8 has functioned as G7. The Russia-Ukraine war may have created compulsions on the West to co-opt India in the group. It will serve New Delhi’s interests better if its Indo-Pacific commitments are kept distinct from a collective western agenda that may not serve its own interests. In steering clear of the doubling-down sanctions on Russia imposed during the G7 meet in Germany, India did just that.
IANS